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Introduction 
On May 20, 2010 Ma Ying-jeou will celebrate the second anniversary of his 
presidency of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. Despite coming to power on a 
wave of optimism, the honeymoon period was short lived. For much of the last two 
years Ma has had public satisfaction rates between 20 and 30 percent.   
 
As we look ahead to the next five to six years Taiwan’s political elites will face severe 
challenges. Their ability to satisfy domestic public opinion, maintain harmonious 
cross-Strait relations and retain international support will determine whether Taiwan 
will be able to sustain its de facto independence and reputation as a model Asian 
democracy.  
 
How did we get to where we are today? 
Between 2000 and 2008 the Kuomintang (KMT) experienced its first taste of being an 
opposition party since the mid 1920s. The KMT returned to power on the back of 
landslide victories in the 2008 elections, winning almost three quarters of 
parliamentary seats, while Ma gained a record high presidential vote share of 56 
percent. The scale of the KMT’s winning margins suggested that Taiwan was again 
becoming a one party dominant political system.  
 
The KMT’s electoral successes enabled Taiwan to return to unified government, with 
the parliament and presidency under the control of the same party for the first time 
since 2000. Since coming to power, the KMT government has been most radical in 
changing Taiwan’s external relations. This has meant that after ten years of 
cross-Strait stalemate, relations between Taiwan and China are at their most 
harmonious since the early 1990s. On the other hand, Taiwan is far less visible on the 
international stage and is more economically dependent on China than ever.  
 
By January 2010 Taiwan and China had held four rounds of semi-official talks, the first 
such negotiations since the late 1990s. These talks resulted in a series of agreements 
on a range of economic issues. The most significant included opening up Taiwan to 
Chinese tourists, regular direct flights and shipping, and increased liberalization in 
their trade and investment relationship. Although cross-Strait tensions have been 
reduced, China has not renounced its threat to militarily retake the island and still 
has at least 1,400 ballistic missiles targeted at Taiwan.  
 
Internationally Taiwan has taken a far more low key approach. Ma has called for a 
diplomatic truce with China, in which they will cease trying to steal each other’s 
diplomatic allies. In the last two years, none of Taiwan’s 23 formal allies have 
switched diplomatic recognition. Taiwan has also abandoned its bid to join the 
United Nations (UN) as a full member, and instead now proposes that Taiwan first be 
admitted into UN specialized agencies such as the World Health Organization. One 
area of continuity, though, is that Taiwan continues to purchase advanced defensive 
weapons systems from the United States, despite the shrill objections coming from 
China.   
 
Despite its huge parliamentary advantage, the KMT administration has been far more 
conservative domestically than its predecessor. Apart from some administrative 
district revisions, there have not been any radical domestic political, social or 
economic reforms of note.  
 
Ma’s first major electoral tests  
Ma’s first major public opinion tests came in the local executive elections in 
December 2009 and parliamentary by-elections in January 2010. Both were seen by 
analysts as setbacks for the KMT. Although it won 12 out of 17 executive seats, it lost 
control of two seats. Moreover, its vote share fell from 51.8 percent in 2005 to 47.8, 
while the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) rose from 39.5 to 45.3 percent. Even 
where the KMT did win in its safe seats, it only won by unexpectedly narrow margins. 
The by-elections in January 2010 were even more humiliating, with the KMT losing all 
three. Particularly noteworthy was Taitung county, which the DPP won for the first 
time ever. These results suggest that predictions of the DPP’s demise and a KMT one 
party dominant system had been premature. Taiwan is once again looking like a 
competitive two party system.  
 
Ma’s declining popularity 
Considering the consistently low public satisfaction levels with Ma these results were 
not entirely surprising. So how had Ma and his KMT become so unpopular so 
quickly?  
 
A range of domestic and external factors have contributed to Ma’s fall from grace. 
Firstly, like when Obama came to power, Ma’s election campaign raised unrealistic 
expectations of change that were impossible to deliver on. This was particularly 
apparent on the economic dimension, where Ma had pledged to both cut 
unemployment and achieve economic growth rates of six percent. However, Taiwan 
was hard hit by the world credit crunch, with negative growth in 2009 and record 
levels of unemployment.  
 
Secondly, Ma’s cabinet suffered from a reputation of weak government performance. 
This perception was especially widespread following its handling of the Morakot 
Typhoon flooding in the summer of 2009, which ultimately led to the resignations of 
the Premier and major cabinet reshuffle.  
 
A third area of dissatisfaction is with the KMT’s cross-Strait policies. Clearly some 
voters are disappointed that the advent of normal cross-Strait trade and transport 
has not led to the promised economic boom. Others complain that trade 
liberalization has undermined certain Taiwanese industries, such as the towel 
producers. The government also took criticism as a result of the scandal over 
melamine contaminated milk powder imports from China in 2008. Ma’s government 
is commonly attacked for being non transparent in its policy making over China. For 
instance, despite its parliamentary majorities, recent cross-Strait agreements have 
not been subjected to parliamentary scrutiny or ratification. Such concerns explain 
why there appears to be limited public understanding of what the proposed 
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China will actually contain 
and limited trust in the government’s ability to put Taiwan’s interest first in such an 
agreement.  
 
The first three variables mainly apply to voters that may have actually supported Ma 
in 2008. However, for those on the anti Chinese side of Taiwanese politics, Ma’s two 
years prove that Ma is hell bent on sacrificing Taiwan’s sovereignty and conspiring to 
cooperate with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) towards the goal of unification. 
Such accusations abound in the anti-KMT media and blogosphere.  
  
Prospects for Taiwan and Cross-Strait relations between 2010 and 2012 
With only two years remaining in Ma’s first term, 2010 is likely to be a key year for 
Taiwan’s future trajectory. Not only will developments this year be critical in 
cross-Strait relations they are also likely to affect Ma’s reelection chances in 2012.  
 
In the field of cross-Strait relations one of Ma’s key goals is to sign the ECFA in mid 
2010. However, if Ma continues to promote ECFA without seeking domestic 
consensus, he is likely to provoke large demonstrations and parliamentary 
confrontations. Since Ma described ECFA as essential for Taiwan’s economic survival, 
failure to achieve ECFA or a postponement would seriously undermine his credibility 
in those business sectors likely to benefit, within the pro China wing of the KMT and 
of course the PRC. If ECFA does pass, then again Ma will need to pray for a significant 
economic revival, which would enable Ma to claim ECFA has saved the economy. But 
of course, if there is little improvement or another recession, then the ECFA and Ma 
will be blamed.  
 
2010 will also probably be the last window of opportunity for a breakthrough in 
cross-Strait relations. Most of the more consensual issues in China Taiwan relations 
were resolved in Ma’s first year in office. Future agreements are likely to be more 
controversial. Now Ma is KMT chairman there is the possibility of a Ma-Hu Jintao 
meeting and even discussions of an interim peace agreement. However, once we get 
into 2011, the next presidential election campaign will be starting. Once it has begun, 
Ma will become far more conservative on cross-Strait compromises for fear of being 
accused of selling Taiwan out to China. This means that if there is not a major 
breakthrough in 2010, then we are likely to see increased levels of impatience with 
the pace of cross-Strait integration from both the Chinese government and Chinese 
nationalists on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.  
 
Another critical factor will be the elections to be held in December 2010. These will 
be for Taipei City, New Taipei City, Tainan City, Kaohsiung City and Taichung City 
mayors. These districts account for over 60 percent of the country’s population. 
Following the last round of elections the DPP seems to be in the ascendency, but 
whichever party wins three of these five mayoral districts is likely be gain a 
considerable momentum for the presidential election in 2012.  
 
Nomination will also play a key role in determining which of the two main parties will 
triumph in 2012. In 2008 the DPP suffered from a divisive presidential primary that 
damaged the party’s general election prospects. The DPP will need to find a 
mechanism for achieving internal consensus on nomination. At this stage, former 
premiers Frank Hsieh and Su Chen-chang, along with current party chairwoman Tsai 
Ying-wen all look potential presidential candidates. Nevertheless for the DPP to be 
electable in 2012, it cannot solely rely on the failures of the Ma administration. 
Instead the DPP will need to find new issue appeals and a more realistic cross-Strait 
policy in order to convince the key battleground swing voters that it is not just a party 
that only knows how to oppose.  
 
Even now it still is hard to imagine that anyone other than Ma will stand for the KMT 
in 2012. However, if current trends continue, the possibility of an internal challenger 
cannot be ruled out. The degree that some within the party have begun to see him as 
a liability was apparent in the way that he was largely absent from campaigning  in 
the recent by-elections. Moreover if the KMT does do badly in the 2010 mayoral 
elections, Ma’s authority is likely to be seriously eroded and this would probably 
force him to resign as KMT chairman. In this kind of situation and if there are 
problems in cross-Strait relations, then an internal KMT challenger could emerge 
from either the localized side of the party, such as parliamentary speaker Wang 
Jin-ping or from the pro China wing.  
 
A final factor that could influence the outcome of 2012 elections is China’s Taiwan 
policy. China is in a contradictory position over Ma and the KMT. On the one hand it 
is in their interests to see him reelected, and so needs to find ways to boost his 
support levels. For instance, initiatives that show Taiwan is gaining economically from 
cross-Strait ties, such as Chinese tourists or investment, or offering Taiwanese 
producers preferential access to the Chinese market all fall into this category. 
Similarly, not poaching Taiwan’s diplomatic allies and giving it limited international 
space, are also designed to help Ma. On the other hand, if the PRC’s support for Ma 
is too overt, there is a strong possibility he will be seen as too soft or pro China, 
something Taiwanese voters tend to dislike.  
 
China will have to be very constrained if it does want to help Ma win election. For Ma 
to win he will need to keep his distance from the PRC and return to a Taiwan centred 
appeal once the presidential campaign gets started in early 2011. This is likely to 
mean that progress on cross-Strait agreement s will be stalled for most of the 
campaign. This would no doubt lead to growing impatience among Chinese 
nationalists and could lead to direct or more likely indirect criticism of Ma’s China 
policies. If China is critical of Ma’s government this would also force Ma to take a 
strong line on China . Another possible scenario that could induce the PRC to get 
involved in the election would be if it actually thought the DPP had a strong chance 
to win and was employing anti-China campaign appeals. This might lead the PRC to 
threaten Taiwanese voters of the dire consequences of voting DPP. When the PRC 
tried this tactic in 1996 and 2000 it backfired seriously and helping its least favoured 
candidates to win election.  
 
Currently it is too early to be sure whether the KMT will be able to hold on to power 
in 2012. The presidential election is likely to be a closely fought contest, while even if 
the KMT wins a parliamentary majority, it will be a much reduced majority. It is even 
possible that 2012-16 will again see a period of divided government with the 
president and parliament controlled by different parties. In short, Taiwan will once 
more be a competitive two party system.  
 
Scenarios for 2012-2016 
Taiwanese voters are bombarded with surveys on national identity and cross-Strait 
relations. Surveys most commonly ask whether voters prefer unification with China, 
independence or maintaining the current de facto independence, known as the 
status quo. Thus when we look ahead to the medium term future or the next 
presidential term of 2012-2016, it is useful to think in terms of similar scenarios. 
Which scenario is more likely will depend on three core variables: (1) domestic 
Taiwanese politics, in particular who wins the 2012 elections and the ability of the 
winners to deliver good economic governance and strengthen its democracy (2) the 
cross-Strait policies pursued by Beijing and Taipei (3) Taiwan’s ability to obtain 
international support.  
 
Back in the early 1990s Simon Long suggested there were six potential future 
scenarios for Taiwan
1
: These were (1) continuation of the status quo, (2) reunification 
under Beijing’s one country two systems, as used in Hong Kong, (3) reunification 
under Taiwan’s terms, (4) independence, (5) reunification by military means, (6) 
peaceful reunification on a compromise formula, preserving Taiwan’s de facto 
independence.  
 
Twenty years later, Long’s framework still offers a useful way to analyze potential 
future developments in the Taiwan- China relationship. The only one of his scenarios 
that we should discount completely is reunification under Taiwan’s terms. Taiwan no 
longer talks of unifying China under Sun Yat-sen’s three people’s principles nor does it 
contest the PRC’s sovereignty over the mainland. I will next discuss the remaining 
five potential scenarios.  
 
(1) A continuation of the status quo.  
There have been claims since the early 1970s that the status quo is untenable. 
Writing in 1991 Long suggested that maintaining the status quo is most probably 
impossible. Twenty years later it remains surprisingly intact.  
 
A continuation of the status quo is most likely if 2012 produces a divided government 
in which the presidency and parliament are controlled by different parties. This 
would prevent either from radically changing cross-Strait relations. However, the 
status quo would also be the probable preferred option even if the KMT or DPP wins 
unified government. This is because there is a tacit consensus at the elite level that 
the status quo is the best solution for the medium term. For instance, in reality Ma’s 
2008 inaugural speech call for “no unification no independence and no war” is little 
different in substance from the DPP’s guiding stance on cross-Strait relations that 
argues there is no need to declare independence as Taiwan is already independent.
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Similarly since reliable surveys have been conducted, something like 60% of voters 
have consistently opted for the status quo as their preferred solution. In contrast, 
independence and especially unification are no more than niche appeals.  
 
For Taiwan to maintain the status quo it will be necessarily to strengthen the quality 
of its governance. Thus for instance, it will need to work on delivering the kind of 
economic growth required to meet the employment needs of its highly educated 
workforce. It will also need to work address social issues, particularly important will 
be dealing with the growing income gap between rich and poor. Lastly, there is a 
need for political reforms to the electoral system. The constitutional reforms of 2005 
created an electoral system that was highly disproportional, this needs to be rectified.  
Another defect is the lack of the requirement for a presidential runoff where the 
winning candidate fails to get over 50 percent of the vote. Rectifying these issues will 
help to resolve the problems of insufficient government legitimacy.  
 
Externally maintaining the status quo relies both on the acquiescence of the United 
States and China. For the United States, a stable status quo is the ideal scenario. It 
can still profit from arms sales, tout Taiwan as a model democracy, contain China and 
avoid Taiwan becoming a divisive issue in Sino-American relations.  
 
The status quo is naturally not satisfactory for the PRC and nor its Chinese 
nationalists bloggers. However, after the bitter experience of the Lee Teng-hui and 
Chen Shui-bian years, the status quo is no longer as terrible as it once seemed. In 
other words, there was a subtle shift in PRC Taiwan policy after 2000 from promoting 
unification to avoiding independence. A stance that can be equated with the status 
quo, at least in the short term. Naturally the biggest external obstacle to maintaining 
the status quo will be whether or when the PRC becomes impatient with the pace of 
cross-Strait integration. The PRC will try to gradually undermine or erode Taiwan’s de 
facto independence. However, the PRC challenges to the status quo are likely to be 
the result of internal elite and domestic pressure and if there is a perception that no 
progress is being made towards reunification.   
 (2) Reunification under the one country two systems 
Reunification under the one country two systems remains the official PRC policy. 
Under this formula Taiwan would retain a degree of autonomy, on slightly better 
terms than Hong Kong or Macau has today. One reason that the PRC has found 
dropping this so hard is that it was the brainchild of Deng Xiao-ping. The problem 
with one country two systems is that it has never been popular either at the elite or 
mass levels within Taiwan. Opinion surveys going back the last ten years show how 
unpopular the proposal is in Taiwan. Surveys consistently found between 80 and 70 
percent of voters were opposed to the formula. Taiwan’s political elites are also 
aware of this unpopularity and thus not a single mainstream politician has ever come 
out in support of it. The only exception was the Chinese nationalist New Party, which 
did take a position close to the formula in 2001. However, the fact that the NP only 
held one out of 225 parliamentary seats between 2000 and 2008 and is now seat less, 
tells us of the unpopularity of their message. Of course it is possible that public and 
elite opinion could shift as a result of closer economic ties and increasing people to 
people contact. However, such an earthquake change in public opinion is unlikely in 
the near future.  
 
The idea of the PRC actually creating its own political party in Taiwan, in the same 
way as in Hong Kong has been discussed as a way to promote its policies has been 
discussed in the China. However, even if it were well funded, Taiwanese public 
opinion is unlikely to support such an undertaking.  
 
(3) Unification under Taiwan’s terms (discounted as too improbable)  
 
(4) Independence.  
At this point we should be clear that what we mean by independence is a new 
Taiwan constitution, flag, national anthem and most importantly declaration of a 
Republic of Taiwan. This is the preferred eventual outcome for many politicians in the 
DPP and among hard-line Taiwanese nationalists. However, recent surveys show that 
only 20 percent of the population support this outcome, compared to over 60 
percent preferring the status quo, thus the independence market is not sufficient to 
win national office. The DPP politicians are aware of this, so it is unlikely even if they 
won both elections that they would pursue this option.  
 
Taiwanese voters when asked if they could accept independence if it could be 
achieved peacefully generally say “yes.” However, both elites and mass opinion is 
aware that the PRC would probably react militarily in the event of an independence 
declaration. This was one of the key lessons Taiwan learnt from the 1996 missile crisis. 
For independence to be achieved it would either require China to accept Taiwan’s 
formal independence or a cast iron security guarantee to protect its independence 
from the USA. The former is unimaginable in the foreseeable future. Even if China’s 
leaders came to the conclusion that accepting a Republic of Taiwan was in their 
national interests it is unlikely that they could resist the pressure for action from 
domestic public opinion and the military. Although the US is generally ambiguous on 
its security guarantees, in 1998 Bill Clinton made his three noes statement, in which 
he pledged that the US does not support Taiwan independence, Taiwan’s entry into 
bodies that require statehood (such as the UN) or one China, one Taiwan or two 
Chinas solution. The US position can be read that it would not support Taiwan in the 
event of a PRC attack after the declaration of de jure independence.  
 
(5) Reunification by military means.  
This option must remain a distinct possibility despite the recent improvement in 
cross-Strait relations during Ma’s first term. When China past its Anti Succession Law 
in 2005, it set out under what conditions China would use military force against 
Taiwan. Key conditions were if Taiwan were to declare a Republic of Taiwan or when 
possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted. Thus if 
Taiwan indefinitely refused to come to the negotiating table to discuss political 
integration, the PRC could in theory be obliged to resolve the Taiwan question by 
military means.  
 
But how likely is it for Taiwan to actually cross the PRC’s red line? If the DPP were to 
win both the presidency and parliamentary elections in 2012, a move towards formal 
declaration of Taiwan independence and promulgating a new Taiwan constitution 
would be possible. However, this would require extremists to dominate the party, 
and currently none of those touted as potential presidential candidates fits that bill. 
Moreover, a constitutional amendment requires the support of three quarters of 
parliament. Considering the DPP currently only holds a quarter of seats, the chances 
of it increasing its seat share from 75 percent in 2012 is not so high. The DPP has 
learnt to its cost that radical Taiwan independence is not a vote winner, so it is likely 
to take a more cautious cross-Strait line even if it does come back to power in 2012.  
 
If the KMT wins both elections or if there is a divided government on Taiwan the 
chances of Taiwan crossing the PRC’s red line on independence are even lower. It is of 
course likely that this if this kind of government takes a conservative stance on 
cross-Strait relations it would create impatience on the PRC side and could lead 
military hawks and Chinese nationalists to call for a military solution based on the 
Anti Succession Law. Nevertheless, within the timeline up to 2016 this is not so likely 
to be judged as having exhausted all possibilities for peaceful unification.  
 
When we consider the military option the other external factor that needs to be 
taken into account is whether the US would intervene to save Taiwan. Here the US 
has been consistently ambiguous. But by reading between the lines we can explain 
the position as the US would probably not support Taiwan if it deemed its actions 
were unnecessarily provocative (such as declaring independence). If Taiwan was 
unable to secure US support, PRC military action would almost inevitably succeed. 
However, if China was deemed as the aggressor, there is a strong chance that the US 
would intervene and thus the prospects for successful unification would be lowered. 
For example, if the PRC used Taiwan’s refusal to enter into unification talks as an 
excuse for military attack, the US would probably be obligated to intervene.  
 
(6) Peaceful reunification on a compromise formula, preserving Taiwan’s de facto 
independence.  
Over the last few years a number of politicians on both sides of Taiwan’s political 
spectrum have raised ideas for some kind of cross-Strait compromise solution. These 
have included proposals for a Chinese confederacy, a two Chinas model or European 
Union style integration. In these models the Republic of China government would 
remain intact but both sides would belong to a loose Greater Chinese union. Such a 
solution would probably be acceptable to Taiwanese public opinion, as most voters 
could accept such a form of unification (so long as it is not called unification) under 
the right design. Also this would be a preferable solution for many in the pro China 
wing of the KMT.  
 
Nevertheless such a development would need to overcome a series of formidable 
hurdles. Firstly, this would require the KMT to maintain its unified government and 
super majority in the parliament, as such a radical constitutional change would 
require support of three quarters of legislators. Based on current opinion surveys it 
looks unlikely that the KMT again gain such a large majority in 2012. Moreover, such 
moves would require a high degree of elite and mass consensus, something which 
the KMT has shown itself incapable of in its first two years in power.  
 
A greater obstacle will be from the PRC. For not only would it need to accept its one 
china two systems model was a failure, it also would need to accept a formula which 
in effect means recognizing two Chinas. Although this is preferable to Taiwan 
independence, China has shown no signs of even considering such an option in the 
last four decades.  
 
Lastly for such a model to work it would require a genuine security guarantee, in 
which China renounces the right to use force against Taiwan and Taiwan would also 
probably hope that the US would offer a security guarantee or at least continued 
defensive arms sales. Both these conditions would be hard for the PRC to accept. In 
fact it is doubtful that the PRC will have the required flexibility for such a solution in 
the next six years.  
 
Conclusion 
A range of domestic and international factors will determine which direction China 
Taiwan relations move towards over the next six years. My analysis suggests that the 
most likely scenario by 2016 will be a continuation of the status quo, in other words 
maintaining Taiwan’s de facto political independence. It is also possible that by 2016 
the first steps towards a compromise formula will have been taken, though this will 
require a new level of flexibility from political elites on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. 
The hopes of Chinese and Taiwanese nationalists for more drastic solutions of 
reunification or independence are likely to be dashed in the foreseeable future.  
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